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Brian Ashcroft 
I. Introduction 
The recent performance of the Scottish economy has been variable. 
After the recession of 1979 to 1981 both the Scottish and UK economies 
exhibited positive growth, with the index of industrial production and 
construction rising by 8.7% and 11.8%, respectively, to the end of 1985. 
However, in 1986 the relative performance of the Scottish economy 
deteriorated. The index fell 3% below that achieved in 1985 while in the 
UK the same industries managed to increase their output by 1.8% over the 
year. The principal reason for the reversal in Scotland's economic fortunes 
lay in the sharp fall in the price of oil during late 1985 and early 1986. The 
collapse of the oil price had obvious consequences for the UK oil supply 
industry which being largely located in Scotland inevitably affected 
Scotland more than the rest of the UK. As output and employment fell so 
the Scottish unemployment rate eventually began to rise at a time when 
unemployment in the UK was beginning to fall, reflecting the strong growth 
in consumer spending and improved export performance as sterling 
depreciated significantly against the D-Mark during 1986. 
With the publication of the delayed 1984 Census of Employment in 
January 1987, media concern about the performance of the Scottish 
economy shifted away from short-term developments to the longer run. 
The Census provided new estimates of the level and composition of the 
civilian employed labour force. Revised projections based on the Census 
suggested that the employed labour force in Britain had fallen by 3% 
between June 1979 and June 1986. Yet, in the Scottish, North, North West 
and Welsh Standard Regions there had been a fall of 8%, 10%, 12% and 
13%, respectively, over the same period. The three southern Standard 
Regions, on the other hand, all exhibited positive employment growth. 
East Anglia recorded a 13% rise, while the South West and the South East 
posted increases of 5% and 2%, respectively. 
For many commentators these figures were clear evidence of a 
"divide" in economic, and particularly employment, opportunities 
between the economies of the north and south of Britain.<!) In addition, 
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several responsible non-governmental bodies such as the Scottish Council, 
the STUC, and the Fraser of Allander Institute, argued that the 
unfavourable imbalance between north and south had worsened over the 
past eight years. (Zl Further deterioration was expected unless positive 
policies were introduced to reverse the trend. The Government responded 
by characterising such views as "facile", "simplistic" and "absurd". (J) 
By the middle of 1987, and at the time of writing, the short-term 
outlook for the Scottish economy had become much more favourable. <4l 
Both the Scottish Business and CBI quarterly surveys had shown a 
progressive increase in business confidence from the beginning of the year. 
Prospects for employment were more encouraging. Seasonally adjusted 
unemployment had fallen by 3,100 a month on average over the six months 
to July. The rate of decline in Scottish unemployment during this period 
was, however, only about two thirds of that in the UK, reflecting the 
residual effects of the oil price fall in 1986 and, arguably, lags in the 
transmission of growth from the centre to the peripheral regions of the UK. 
Nevertheless, with the British economy enjoying faster growth than most of 
its international competitors and the signs of the upturn also clearly evident 
in Scotland, the question of the existence of a divide in economic 
opportunities between the north and south of Britain slipped from the 
headlines. But for those who believed in the existence of the division the 
recent improvements had simply drawn a temporary veil over the 
fundamental imbalance. 
This chapter first considers the arguments for and against the 
proposition of a north-south divide. A consideration of the performance of 
key economic indicators in the British Standard regions going back to the 
1960s, suggests that there is no simple dichotomy between the economic 
performance of the "north" and the "south" of Britain. Nevertheless, in 
those regions including Scotland that are traditionally assigned to the 
"north" there would appear to be a persistent lack of employment 
opportunities compared with the "south". The performance of the 
"midland" regions does, however, complicate the picture and it is arguable 
whether they should be considered separately from the rest. Moreover, 
variations in economic performance both within and between regions over 
time, should not be ignored. 
The second section examines the economic forces that may be 
contributing to the division and the extent to which central government 
policies may be having a deleterious effect. It is suggested here that the 
imbalance may be viewed as a long-run phenomenon. Comparative 
regional economic performance is governed by the spatial distribution of 
economic activities and the national and international competitive 
pressures for industrial restructuring which are occurring against the 
background of a more permissive policy environment. The rigidity of 
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Finally, the chapter concludes by asking whether government can play 
a positive role in restricting the tendency to economic polarisation between 
the north and south of Britain while preserving an environment favourable 
to national economic growth. 
2. A North-South Divide? 
The Arguments 
In general terms, it has been suggested that the regional problem in 
Britain can be viewed as one of fundamental imbalance in economic 
opportunities between the Standard regions of East Anglia, the South East 
and the South West-the "south" -and the restofBritain-the "north". For 
example, a 1983 report from the Regional Studies Association put it this 
way: 
"the evidence . . . . supports the identification of a basic regional 
dualism in the UK (consisting) on the one hand of a 'Greater South 
East England' zone of relative prosperity and, on the other, most of 
the rest of the country, characterised in general by economic debility 
and decline. "<5> 
Against this must be set the quite reasonable argument that Britain's 
urban and regional problems are complex. Areas of prosperity and promise 
exist in both the so-called "north" and "south". Differentiating between 
economic opportunities above and below a line drawn from the Wash to the 
Severn is therefore a crude and oversimplified way to categorise the 
economic geography of Britain. <6> 
Proponents of the proposition go further, arguing that following the 
publication of the Census of Employment the imbalance is most clearly 
seen in, and therefore caused by, a lack of employment opportunities. A 
division which must eventually affect average incomes. However, those 
who would dismiss the notion of a north-south divide point to the recent 
more rapid improvement in unemployment in some northern regions such 
as the North and Wales compared with the rest of Britain. Other regions in 
the north particularly Scotland have higher levels of income per head than 
some southern regions and high rates of growth of manufacturing 
productivity. 
The Evidence 
Economists conventionally use the net value of output produced 
within a region per head of population as an index of living standards. Table 
1 presents the most recent data for the Standard Regions of the UK, 
comparing gross domestic product (GDP) per head as a percentage of the 
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UK average over the ten year period 1975 to 1985. In terms of GDP per 
head it is clear that there is no simple division between north and south. In 
1975, East Anglia and the South Westranked8and 9, respectively, with the 
South East pre-eminent. However, over the period all three southern 
regions exhibited the fastest rates of growth, resulting in East Anglia and 
the South West moving up the rankings to second and sixth, respectively, 
while the South East retained its premier position. The other "northern" 
regions, in contrast, all either retained their relative position or lost ground. 
The most obvious example of deteriorating relative fortunes is the West 
Midlands. This region, traditionally one of the prosperous UK regions, 
experienced significant relative decline, moving from second to eighth in 
the rankings, as manufacturing and the car industry in particular 
contracted. 
Table 1: Gross Domestic Product per Head in UK Regions, 1975-85 
Region GDPperhead Change in GDP 
as%ofUK per head as% 
average of UK average 
1975 1985 1975-85 
% Rank % Rank % Rank 
EastAnglia 92.8 8 100.8 2 +8.0 1 
SouthWest 90.3 9 93.8 6 +3.5 2 
South East 112.9 1 114.8 1 +1.9 3 
Greater London 125.8 125.8 0.0 
Rest of SE 103.6 107.7 +4.1 
Scotland 97.1 3 97.3 3 +0.2 4 
Wales 88.7 10 88.8 10 +0.1 5 
NorthWest 96.2 4 %.0 4 -0.2 6 
East Midlands 96.1 5 95.7 5 -0.4 7 
North 93.6 7 92.9 7 -0.7 8 
Yorks & Humber 94.1 6 91.8 9 -2.3 9 
N. Ireland 80.0 11 74.8 11 -5.2 10 
West Midlands 100.0 2 92.3 8 -7.7 11 
Note: Ranking is by Standard Region 
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The posttiOn of Scotland clearly differs from the other peripheral 
regions of the UK such as the North, Wales and Northern Ireland. 
Throughout the period Scotland retained its high third position in the 
rankings and GDP per head actually grew somewhat more quickly than the 
UK average. Figure I charts GDP growth in Scotland and the UK over four 
periods between 1966 and 1985. The four periods roughly correspond to the 
tenure of successive governments. It is clear from figure I, that in the 
second decade the growth of GDP alone was lower in Scotland. The 
relative improvement in GDP per head in the Scottish economy must 
therefore have been due to a slower population growth and faster rate of 
outmigration than in the UK as a whole. Nevertheless, in the decade to the 
mid 1970s the growth of GDP was greater in Scotland than in the UK. 
reflecting the vigorous regional policy of the period. diversification towards 
more quickly growing industries and, of course, the discovery and 
exploitation of North Sea oil. Furthermore. while the growth of GDP was 
lower in Scotland in the seven years to 1985 than in the UK, the differential 
did narrow compared with the period 1974 to 1979. The narrowing of the 
differential can largely be explained by the success in attracting inward 
investment, resulting in significant output growth in the electronics and 
pharmaceutical industries and rapid productivity growth. But. sadly. the 
comparative buoyancy of GDP growth in Scotland did little to stem 
employment decline. 
Fig. I GDP Change in Scotland and 
UK: 1966 to 1985 [Percent] 
'66-'70 '70-'74 '74·'79 '79·'85 
Souce: Sc:otlish Ec:ollomie B1111eliD, No. 33, 1986 ;mel lllqJOblished data. 
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Fig. 2 Employment Change: Scotland 
and Britain: 1966 to 1986 [Percent] 
-~!1 , 
'66-'70 '70-'74 '74-'79 '79-'83 '83-'86 
Souce: Regiooall'lencb aod EmploymeDt Gazette, Vol95 No. 2, llistorical Supplement No. I, February 1987. 
Figure 2 compares the change in employees in employment in Scotland 
and Britain during the tenure of successive governments over the period 
1966 to 1986. (7) What is clear from the figure is that the gap between the 
employment performance of Scotland and Britain has progressively 
deteriorated under successive governments. From a favourable difference 
of 0.9 percentage points between 1966 and 1970, the performance gap 
became negative and increasingly so, with shortfalls of -0.2, -0.6, -0.9 
and -3 percentage points, in 70-74, 74-79, 79-83 and 83-86, respectively. 
The figures for Scotland during the period from June 1983 to June 1986 will 
have been affected to some extent by the effects of the oil price collapse 
during the first half of 1986. Nevertheless, it is not unreasonable to suggest 
on the basis of this evidence that Scotland has been experiencing a long-run 
decline in employment opportunities compared with Britain as a whole. 
For northern Britain the picture is less clear cut. Figure 3 charts the 
employment change in the north and south of Britain over the same period. 
Regions were assigned to the "north" if their employment performance was 
at least 10% worse than the GB average in a majority of the five periods. 
While this procedure is somewhat arbitrary it results in a clear geographical 
division. The East Midlands are included with East Anglia, the South East 
and the South West in the "south", while the West Midlands are assigned 
with the remaining regions to the "north". The north and south are 
therefore divided by a line running roughly from the Humber to the Severn. 
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Fig. 3 Employment Change: North and 
South 1966 to 1986 [Percent] 
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'66-'70 '70-'74 '74-'79 '79-'83 '83-'86 
Soaree: llegioDal Truda ud Em~DI Gazette, Vol. 95 No. Z, Jlis1orica1 Sapplemeat No. I, Felmwy 1987. 
Several conclusions about the so-called '·north-south divide" can be 
drawn from figure 3. First, employment performance has been consistently 
worse in the north under successive Labour and Conservative 
governments. Secondly. when the national economy experiences an upturn 
the differential appears to narrow,(~) although the evidence noted above 
suggests that this may be less true for Scotland. Thirdly, the figure does not 
provide conclusive evidence that the gap is widening. Yet, it is interesting to 
note that when the two consecutive upturns, 74-79 and 83-86, are 
compared, employment growth in Britain was greater by 0.9 percentage 
points in the latter period hut the north-south differential was worse by 2 
percentage points. This was the case even though the diferential had 
narrowed compared with that in the recession of 79-83. Whether the 
differential will continue to widen is an open question but what appears to 
be beyond doubt is that the division between north and south became more 
acute in the 1980s. 
Much the same conclusions can he drawn from a consideration of 
regional unemployment rates, where differences between the northern and 
southern regions have tended to narrow with an upturn in the national 
economy and widen during national recession. Moreover, in the first five 
years of the present decade the differential widened appreciably.('~> It 
should be remembered, however, that the unemployment rate may prove 
to be an inadequate guide to the absence of job opportunities in an area. 
Supply-side responses to job loss such as migration and the failure of some 
groups, particularly women, to register their unemployment when no 
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benefit is due, may limit the unemployment increase. 
The gap between the employment performance of the north and the 
south is clearly sizable. Yet this is not to deny that there is an increasingly 
complex geographical pattern of economic advantage and disadvantage at 
sub-regional and urban levels in Britain. For many years more urbanised 
areas throughout the UK and other industrialised countries have 
performed less well than the urban periphery and more rural locations.! Ill) 
The north- south division in employment performance simply overlays that 
urban-rural shift. Recent research by J B Goddard and M G Coombes!! I) 
makes this point clear. When an index of local economic performance(m 
was constructed for the 280 loeallabour market areas in Britain the authors 
concluded: 
" .... within each region the variation between best and worst 
performing places spans a very wide range. Here, an emphasis on 
extreme cases would stress the substantial overlap between regions. 
However, more robust analysis relates to the interquartile range 
(excluding the extreme quartiles for each region). The interquartile 
ranges for the three south and east regions hardly overlap at all with 
those for the five northern and western regions, with the two Midland 
regions fittingly straddling this divide ....... The conclusion must he 
that the clear existence of strong local contrasts in economic well-
being arc in no way a disproof of a substantial, and probably 
widening, north-south divide."( 1-'l 
3. Polarising Influences 
The causes of the relative lack of job opportunities in the north are 
complex. In essence, the imbalance may be viewed as a long-run 
phenomenon reflecting the existing spatial distribution of economic 
activities, wage rigidity in northern labour markets, regional myopia and 
metropolitan bias on the part of UK companies aided by national and 
international competitive pressures for industrial restructuring, and an 
increasingly permissive policy environment. 
As figure 4 indicates there is a long-run decline in the provision of 
manufacturing jobs, although not in manufacturing output. The job losses 
in manufacturing are heavily concentrated in the north because as 
manufacturing industry grew it largely favoured northern locations. Figure 
5 shows that for most of the period the north's share of manufacturing 
employment has been in decline. After reaching a peak during the period of 
57.2% in 1973 it had declined to 52.1% by 1986. Scotland's share also 
declined but at a slightly greater rate, falling from a peak during the period 
of 8.8% in 1974 to 8% in 1986. The decline in Scotland's share of 
manufacturing employment has occurred despite employment growth in 
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Fig. 4 Manufacturing & Service Employment 
Britain: 1971 to 1986 [OOO's] 
'71 '72 '73 '74 '75 '76 '77 '78 '79 '80 '81 '82 '83 '84 '85 '86 
Source: Employment Gazette, VoL 95 No. 2, llistorical Supplement No. 1, Febnwy 1987. 
Fig. 5 Manufacturing Employment in 
North and South: 1971 to 1986 [OOO's] 
'71 '72 '73 '74 '75 '76 '77 '78 '79 '80 '81 '82 '83 '84 '85 '86 
Soarce' Employment Gazette, VoL 95 lfo. Z, llistorical Sapplement No. 1, Fehraary 1987. 
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drink and tobacco and pharmaceuticals. So, for example, the electronics 
industry in Scotland has since 1979 provided only one job for every fifty lost 
elsewhere in manufacturing; and in the period 1981 to 1984 each of nine 
manufacturinf industries lost more jobs than the number gained in 
electronics. <14 Indeed, it is precisely because so few jobs have been created 
in the "high-tech" industries in Scotland compared with their contribution 
to output, that manufacturing productivity has risen so quickly over the last 
few years. Moreover, when jobs are created in these industries relatively 
few indirect jobs are created elsewhere in the Scottish economy. 
Employment multipliers estimated from the 1979 Scottish Input-Output 
Tables show that .for every one job created in computers, instrument 
engineering and aerospace, only 0.33, 0.22 and 0.13 jobs, respectively, are 
created via linkages to other Scottish firms. In contrast, a traditional 
Scottish industry such as whisky generates two other jobs for every one 
direct job created in the industry. 
Figure 4 shows that the service sector, in sharp contrast to 
manufacturing, has experienced a sustained expansion of employment. 
This rapid growth in service employment is, however, seen in figure 6 to be 
gradually concentrating in the south, with the north's share declining from 
45.9'1o in 1977 to 44.1% in 1986. In Scotland, for example, service sector 
Fig. 6 Service Employment in 
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employment increased by 1.1% between 1980 and 1986, whereas in the 
South East service jobs rose by 7.6%. Moreover, over the same period the 
jobs in this sector actually fell in two of the northern regions, the North 
West and Wales, by 2.6% and 3%, respectively. All southern regions, in 
contrast, posted an increase. 
There are also clear differences in performance within the service 
sector. Table 2, breaks down employment change in services between 1971 
and 1986 into six broad groupings. The three fastest growing sectors in 
Great Britain all grew more quickly in the south. In Scotland two of the 
three fastest growing sectors also grew appreciably slower than the 
northern average, although this may in part be due to both Banking, 
Insurance and Finance, and Wholesale distribution, Hotels and Catering, 
being disproportionately represented in Scotland at the beginning of the 
period. At the other extreme, Transport and Communciations, which 
actually lost jobs during the period, contracted significantly more rapidly in 
the north than the south. Retail distribution, which experienced low 
positive growth in Britain as a whole, also contracted in the north while 
experiencing a positive rate of growth in the south over twice as fast as the 
national average. Only Public administration and Defence grew more 
quickly in the north than the south and this must in part reflect the limited 
dispersal of civil servants to northern regions in the 1970s and particularly 
the early 1980s. 
Table 2: Employment Change in Service Sector Industries, 
June 1971 to June 1986 (Percentages) 
GB South North Scotland 
Banking, Insurance 
& Finance 65.5 67.4 62.2 52.9 
Education, Health 
&Other 37.5 40.3 34.5 39.5 
Wholesale distribution 
Hotels & Catering 35.3 36.9 33.5 25.9 
Public administration 
& Defence 11.2 9.8 13.1 18.4 
Retail distribution 5.3 11.7 -1.5 -2.6 
Transport& 
Communications -13.7 -5.4 -23.7 -23.6 
Notes: the "south'' is East Anglia, South East, South West and East 
Midlands; the "north" is Scotland, North, North West, Yorks & 
Humber, Wales and West Midlands. 
Source: Employment Gazette, Historical Supplement No. I, Vol. 95 
No.2, Department of Employment, February 1987. 
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There is some suggestion here that tradeable services which generate 
high value added and offer highly skilled employment may be tending to be 
concentrated in the south. Examples include the intermediate producer 
services, such as finance, legal, insurance, professional, technical, 
distribution and maintenance activities, and the intermediate consumer 
services, such as the production of television programmes, computer 
software, and cable communications. "Low-level" services which directly 
serve local consumers and offer low skilled, often part-time, and usually 
female employment, may conversely be performing relatively better in the 
north. However, the disaggregated data necessary to evaluate this 
contention is limited. Nevertheless, recent data for Scotland does appear to 
point in this direction. Between 1981 and 1984, the Scottish share of GB 
employment increased in Personal Services by 1% point and in the Repair 
of Consumer Goods by 1.1% points, while Scotland's share of employment 
in Banking and Finance, Posts and Telecommunications, and Insurance fell 
by 1.4%, 0.9% and 0.2% points, respectively. But, Scotland's share of 
Business Services increased very slightly by 0.1% points, which is contrary 
to the suggested trend. 
The relatively poorer performance of manufacturing and service 
employment in the north may partly be explained by the concentration of 
declining traditional activities in northern locations. However, this cannot 
account for the unequal spatial incidence of the location of new jobs both at 
the aggregate level in manufacturing and services and in particular sub-
sectors. Although industries depending on local demand which tend largely 
to be in the service sector will have performed less well in the north as the 
traditional economic base contracted. That apart, other explanations are 
required to account for the relative imbalance in job opportunities. 
One possibility is the failure of regional wages to adjust to 
geographical shifts in the demand for labour. On this view it is the 
downward wage rigidity in northern labour markets that is mainly 
responsible for the relative lack of job creation in areas of high 
unemployment. (IS) Indeed the present government's policies towards the 
labour market are based on this belief, as can be seen by this 
pronouncement from the Trade and Industry Secretary in 1983: 
. . . . real wages that are incompatible with the demand for labour 
create unemployment both regionally and nationally . . . . . wage 
flexibility could and should be increased. (In) 
There is clearly some substance in the view that wages have failed to 
respond to variations in the regional demand for labour. Firms with plants 
in several regions tend to pay similar rates for the same occupations 
irrespective of the location. Wage rates are usually set at the national rather 
than the regional level through the collective bargaining process. And 
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from regions such as the South East, where the demand for labour is
relatively high, to occupations and industries in regions where labour
demand is relatively low. 
The significance of downward wage rigidity to the comparative lack of
job opportunities in northern labour markets has been overstated. In
theory, firms will take on more workers if the value of production obtained
from the extra employment is at least as great as the wages paid. However,
if the value of the extra production that can be sold falls in proportion to the
wage cut because workers reduce their expenditures on local goods and
services then there will be Iitle effect on employment. In technical terms the
real wages paid by firms remain unchanged even though nominal wages
have been reduced.<17l Moreover, even if real wages were reduced in 
northern regions there is no guarantee in the short run that firms either will 
be able to sell more goods to warrant the extra employment, or that they
would seize the opportunity to hire more labour at the lower wage cost. 
First, the insensitivity of the demand for goods and services to changes
in price could mean that wage cuts would have to be draconian before there
was much impact on employment and this would have obvious
consequences for industrial relations and the morale and living standards of
workers. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, it is unlikely that any 
feasible wage cuts would be sufficient to overcome firms' perceptions of the 
advantages of a location in the south. There is a wealth of academic
evidence to suggest that businessmen and other individuals give a 
disproportionate weight to those areas with which they are familiar. <18) The 
level of knowledge about other areas diminishes rapidly as distance 
increases, resulting in what can only be described as regional myopia. UK
firms have traditionally exhibited a metropolitan and southern bias in the 
location of their headquarters and production facilities. Evidence on the 
effects of regional policy in the 1960s and 1970s suggests that regional 
financial incentives had little impact in inducing firms to move out of the 
south. However, once firms had to consider a re-location because of
shortages of space, skilled labour, or the refusal of an Industrial 
Development Certificate, then the incentives did play a role in diverting 
firms to the assisted areas. <19) In essence, regional myopia or metropolitan 
bias led many firms in the south to discount the regional incentives and 
much the same outcome can be expected if real wages were lower in the 
north. Furthermore, changes in the structure and organisation of firms' 
production would appear to have increased the potential for a 
concentration of key economic activities in the south. 
The growth in the size of companies, often operating on a world scale, 
and technical developments in both communications and production 
processes, have raised the potential for functional specialisation within 
companies. This specialisation has in turn led to spatial divisions in the 
location of functions. At its simplest this means that key managerial control 
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- or headquarters - functions, such as investment planning, and key 
operating functions, such as marketing and R & D, can be located in one 
location, while firms' production facilities may, if necessary, be located 
elsewhere. In consequence, different types of employment can be offered: 
more highly skilled labour being required to satisfy the needs of the key 
control and operating functions, while less qualified labour is needed at the 
point of production. 
It can be argued that spatial specialisation by function has been 
occurring, that it intensified in the 1970s and early 1980s, largely through a 
process of acquisitions and rationalisations, and ferhaps inevitably this 
process has worked to the advantage of the south. <20 Headquarters and key 
operating functions are increasingly to be found in the south, while the 
quality of labour available in the north has probably suffered, following the 
outmigration of workers as the demand for key skills diminished. <"I) This 
process has also been overlaid on a pattern of sectoral specialisation which, 
as noted above, has been changing, again to the probable long-run 
disadvantage of the north. 
In sum, this argument contends that the trends discussed above appear 
to have led to a concentration of the more modern, technologically-
advanced, high value added, and research-oriented sectors in the south. 
Specialisation within sectors and companies has also favoured the south 
through the location and re-location of key control and operating functions. 
Moreover, when the north and particularly Scotland has attracted modern 
growth industries such as electronics, it has largely been through the siting 
of production facilities without the key control and operating functions 
which are so necessary to regional development. The attraction of new 
"high- tech" industries to the regions therefore appears to provide little 
guarantee of a narrowing of the division. However, data on the 
geographical incidence and effects of industrial restructuring in Britain, is 
limited. It seems unlikely that the strong centripetal forces favouring 
southern locations will rigidly benefit the South East, East Anglia and the 
South West to the exclusion of all other regions. It can also be disputed 
whether any imbalance that exists between north and south is a long-run 
phenomenon. The decline in manufacturing industry which historically 
concentrated in the north will be of diminishing importance as its relative 
size contracts. All regions might be expected to benefit from increased 
growth in the service sector. But, the position of London and therefore the 
South East as the key UK financial and commercial centre suggests that 
financial and business services, the fastest growing parts of the service 
sector, are more likely to be concentrated there. 
The present government in its public pronouncements has shown little 
recognition of the social, political and economic consequences if the 
suggested polarising tendencies of industrial restructuring produce their 
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reliance on market forces compared with its predecessors has probably 
served to widen regional disparities in the UK to the detriment ofthe north. 
One example usually cited is the progressive decline in regional policy 
expenditures and the relaxation of Industrial Development Certificate 
control since the late 1970s, followed by the radical cutback in planned 
outlays since 1984.<22) The run-down since the mid-70s of New Town and 
overs pill policies and the growth of inner-city and urban initiatives may also 
have diminished the relative attractiveness of northern locations. 
Furthermore, the existing and planned concentration of major 
infrastructure investments in London and the south east: London's third 
airport at Stansted; the construction of the M25 and future completion of 
the Mll motorways; the regeneration of London's dockland; and the 
construction of the Channel Tunnel, all serve to increase the relative 
attractiveness of the south east of England to new jobs in manufacturing 
and service industry. One recent study has forecast that by 1995 these 
developments will result in almost half the projected net gain of 0. 9 million 
UK jobs being concentrated in the south east of England. <23l 
Competition policy and the corporate tax environment has under the 
present government moved in favour of takeovers and mergers. In 1983 the 
government overruled the findings of the Monopolies and Mergers 
Commission which had found against the takeover of Anderson 
Strathclyde by Charter Consolidated partly because of the anticipated 
detrimental effect to the Scottish economy. This was subsequently followed 
by a statement from the then Industry Minister, Norman Tebbit, that future 
takeover bids would only be referred to the Commission on competitive 
grounds. In addition, following the phased abolition in 1984 of investment 
allowances, investment in plant and machinery effectively became more 
expensive. This biased the choice faced by some companies against 
investment in new plant and machinery in favour of the takeover of firms' 
existing assets. For these. and other reasons, takeovers have increased 
dramatically in the last few years, with the proportion of UK merger 
expenditure accounted for by the acquisition of Scottish companies rising 
from 2.4% in 1984, to 14.4% in 1985 and 26.1% in the first three quarters of 
1986. The acquisition of only three companies: Bells, Distillers and Coats 
Paton obviously contributed significantly to this increase, nevertheless it is 
clear that the level of external takeover of Scottish owned companies has 
risen appreciably in the last few years. 
The available evidence on the effects of the external takeover of 
Scottish companies suggests that the companies themselves tend on balance 
to benefit in terms of improved sales performance and growth. On average 
employment is little affected. However, external takeovers are a cause for 
concern because the associated loss of key control functions and the loss of 
operating functions such as R & D and marketing, coupled with the general 
transfer of business away from local suppliers, particularly professional 
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services, will almost certainly be to the detriment of the wider Scottish 
economy.<24l The unrestricted growth of external takeovers, with no prior 
government evaluation of the potential internal company benefits against 
the likely cost to the wider regional economy, could well have contributed 
to a worsening of regional disparities in the UK and hence the so-called 
north-south divide. 
Government policy in favour of the develoment of small firms has 
expanded in recent years, yet recent research suggests that this too may be 
worsening regional differentials. <25) Prosperous regions in the south with 
high levels of potential entrepreneurship were found to benefit most in 
terms of the take-up of the Business Expansion, Enterprise Allowance and 
Loan Guarantee schemes. The policy therefore appears to be reinforcing 
existing regional differences in entrepreneurship. 
Finally, it should be remembered that the government's initial 
adoption of what is usually described as a "monetarist" macro-economic 
policy stance and its refusal to use discretionary fiscal policy to smooth the 
path of the business cycle, led to a contraction of output in 1979 to 1981 that 
was much more pronounced than would otherwise have occurred. The 
combination of a tight monetary policy, rising oil prices and the increased 
significance of North Sea oil precipitated a significant increase in the 
exchange rate which seriously affected the competitiveness of 
manufacturing industry. The resulting contraction of manufacturing output 
and employment served to widen regional disparities in the UK. 
It cannot, however, be guaranteed that the current economic upturn 
will simply reverse the effects of the 1979 to 1981 recession. The scale of the 
recession in those years was so severe that many manufacturers were forced 
to review all aspects of their activities. With regional policy contracting, 
many firms took advantage of the recession to make a desired locational 
adjustment to the pattern of their production in favour of locations at or 
near their headquarters in the south. Moreover, many parts of 
manufacturing industry closed during the recession never to reopen again. 
Changes in the pattern of comparative advantage between Britain and the 
rest of the world meant that industries such as coal, shipbuilding, steel, 
textiles, and mechanical engineering, would never again attain the position 
they had in the economy even in 1979. And, as the earlier discussion 
suggested, the north is attracting a smaller share of the jobs being created in 
the fast growing service industries. The north has of course had some 
success in attracting the "new" manufacturing industries with, for example, 
almost £2 billion of inward investment being attracted to Scotland alone 
since the early 1980s. But it is clear that these industries will never be able to 
provide jobs on the scale of traditional industry, nor will this new industry 
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4. Conclusions 
The evidence presented in this chapter suggests that on the 
conventional indicator of economic well being, GDP per head, there is no 
simple division between north and south. Over the ten years from 1975, 
Scotland retained its position as the region with the third highest level of 
GDP per head. Nevertheless, changes in that indicator since 1975 have 
clearly been most favourable in the three most southerly regions: East 
Anglia, the South West and the South East. A consideration of 
employment performance does suggest, however, that a clear distinction 
can be made between the job opportunities available in regions above and 
below a line drawn from the Humber to the Severn. Variations in economic 
performance do occur within regions but recent research suggests that once 
extremes are excluded the range of variation hardly overlaps in the five 
northern regions and the three regions of the extreme south. The range of 
variation in the Midland regions tends to straddle this divide, although the 
average employment performance of the West Midlands and the East 
Midlands is more closely related to regions further north in the former and 
to regions further south in the latter. 
Of the polarising forces likely to have contributed to the division, the 
effects of industrial restructuring aided by a more permissive policy 
environment appear to be of most significance. The failure of wages in 
northern labour markets to adjust to geographical shifts in demand may 
have played a contributory role but it appears unlikely that increased 
flexibility in regional wages would have much impact on the problem. 
Can the government play a positive role in restricting the tendency to 
economic polarisation between the north and south of Britain while 
preserving an environment favourable to national economic growth? 
The prescriptions on offer from the present government and the 
opposition political parties leave much to be desired. A somewhat crude 
characterisation of their positions sees the government pursuing a policy of 
increasing reliance on market forces. State intervention, in the form of an 
improvement in the presentation and delivery of existing policies and the 
removal of bureaucratic constraints, is to be used to encourage initiative 
and enterprise. For the opposition, increased state intervention would 
channel greater financial resources through new and existing political 
structures in an attempt to stimulate development generally in the north 
and in the inner cities in the south. Both positions appear to betray a lack of 
understanding of the processes generating the division in employment 
opportunities between north and south. 
The central thesis of this chapter is that the processes of industrial 
restructuring during the last decade have shifted the locus of control over 
economic activity in the UK even more in favour of the south. As the 
operation of the market gradually shifts control to the south, so managerial 
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and professional staff are drawn away from the north and the prospects for 
the stimulation of enterprise in those regions diminishes. Increasing 
concentration in the south in turn provides increased market opportunities 
which sustains the development process in a potentially cumulative spiral. 
Polarisation between north and south increases as a result. 
It is of course possible to argue that the process of concentration will 
only go so far, that problems of congestion, increasing rents and rising 
property prices will reverse the process, resulting in growth spreading back 
to the north. But even if this does occur the costs of the adjustment to both 
national and regional economies will be high. Costs which might be avoided 
if the government would add a determination to encourage the 
decentralisation of economic control to its commitment to stimulate local 
enterprise. 
Nor does the solution to the lack of employment opportunities in the 
north depend solely on expanding the resources available to deal with the 
problem, although increased resources would almost certainly help. 
Greater resources channelled through Urban Development Corporations, 
Local Authorities, and regional agencies such as the SDA, in partnership 
with private developers, can do much to remove the dereliction and 
improve the infrastructure of the inner cities and other urban areas. The 
fabric of many British cities, both in the south and particularly the north, 
has deteriorated markedly during the last few years owing to the significant 
number of factory closures. Improved infrastructure in the urban areas 
would appear to be a necessary condition for economic development and 
much needed, if temporary, local jobs would be created in the process of 
urban renewal. In addition, increased regional policy incentives would, 
given the academic evidence on the effects of the policy, increase the flow 
of mobile jobs to northern locations and stimulate indigenous employment. 
However, it is unlikely that the increased expenditures, both public 
and private, would do much to reverse the increasing centralisation of 
company headquarters functions in the south. Valuable jobs would be 
created but they would be largely confined to the semi-skilled, the 
unskilled, and often part-time female employees. If the northern regions 
are to increase their economic independence then large numbers of jobs 
must be created in the managerial and professional categories. And if this is 
to be achieved policy must address the question of how best to effect the 
decentralisation of economic control. Political and administrative 
devolution could help, but that in itself will not be a complete answer to the 
problem. What is required is nothing less than a radical change in attitudes 
by key decision makers in government and industry who currently perceive 
that economic, political and cultural activity can only be satisfactorily 
conducted in the south. Until that time the so-called north-south divide will 
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Brian Ashcroft, Fraser of Allander Institute and Department of 
Economics, University of Strathclyde. 
I am grateful to lain Jenkins for his comments on an earlier draft of this 
chapter. Errors and omissions remain my own. 
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